peter b zwack

GLOBAL SPEAKER

ADVISOR/CONSULTANT

SPEAKER AVAILABILITY & FEES

Leadership
Russia Affairs
Eurasia Affairs
Joint Presentation
Keynote Address

Defense Attaché to Moscow 2012 – 2014

Global Fellow at The Kennan Institute
Woodrow Wilson International Center

University of Pennsylvania – Adjunct Fellow

Senior Russia-Eurasia Research Fellow
National Defense University 2015 – 2019

Closing the remaining US consulates in Russia is shortsighted

Lost in the swirl of American post-election chaos, culminating in the appalling storming of the U.S. Capitol, and the reported major Russian cyber hacks was Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s notification to Congress on Dec. 10 about the State Department’s decision to close its remaining two consulates in Russia.

The U.S. Consulate General Vladivostok, in the Russian Far East (RFE) distantly located from Moscow, would be fully shuttered, while the other in centrally located Ekaterinburg, suspended. The cited staffing issues relate to the 2017 tit-for-tat downsizing of diplomatic personnel and missions in the U.S. and Russia, as well as related cost challenges.

To be clear: This is a unilateral U.S. decision.

It must be emphasized however, that while Moscow did not order our consulates closed, it went great lengths to limit embassy and consular manning and support which led to the State Department decision — gaining what Moscow likely really wants, while the Russian consulates in the U.S. — in Houston and New York — stay open.

Despite abysmal U.S.-Russia relations, this decision’s timing is problematic. Neither consulate should be closed — especially Vladivostok — without a chance for the incoming Biden administration to directly address key staffing, visa, and facility maintenance and safety support issues with the up-to-now obstructive Russians.

This perspective in no way exonerates Moscow from a wide range of malign actions, whether the recently reported major hacking of U.S. government and business entities, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, or a wide-range of Kremlin-driven adversarial actions worldwide. These actions are inexcusable and must continue to be firmly and proactively countered in coordination with like-minded nations. However, closing our consulates without the new administration’s review and validation is not our best course of action.

This is exactly when — not just during good relations — we should want to maintain U.S. representational “outposts” in key nations during troubled times as long as there are not direct physical threats to personnel. Public diplomacy remains crucial when very little other bilateral activity can take place, and it is best to engage the Russian public throughout Russia — not just in and around Moscow.

I have a long history with Russia dating back over three decades as private U.S. citizen, student, traveler, and during the challenging 2012-2014 timeframe as our senior military diplomat in Moscow. As such, I saw how both Americans and Russians benefitted from the scope of U.S. consular services, ranging from providing visa and emigration services for Russian citizens, aid for travelers, facilitating business travel and contacts, and providing support for official delegations.

These consulates exemplify U.S. cultural bridgeheads with direct access and relationships to local populations and officials. Functioning regardless of whether relations are good or challenged, their presence helps maintain practical contact with host nation populations, thereby helping to keep temperatures down in time of tensions and crisis. This is precisely why we should keep the Vladivostok and Ekaterinburg consulates open.

Vladivostok is of particular importance. Connected by the Trans-Siberian railway and home of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, it is resource-rich Russia’s gateway to the Pacific. Nearby, along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, is Russia’s vast 2,600-mile border with China, where border clashes broke out near Khabarovsk in 1969. Today relations are significantly better between these distinctly different behemoths with major trade and commerce along their immense boundary. Unprecedented joint Chinese-Russian military maneuvers took place in the greater region in 2018 and 2019.

To the south, just 80 miles away, is Russia’s border with complicated North Korea. Vladivostok also is a maritime terminus for travel through the Bering Strait bordering Alaska and into the widening Northern Sea Route (NSR), in a rapidly melting Arctic. Notably, Vladivostok is much closer to Anchorage and San Francisco than to distant Moscow, seven time zones away. Such distances make it hard to manage American interests in the RFE from U.S. Embassy Moscow.

As a post-military academic and analyst, I took an extensive trip along the wind-swept Amur and Ussuri as recently as November 2018. My itinerary took me to historic Khabarovsk, the unique Jewish Autonomous Region in Birobidzhan, and halfway to Mongolia, to the fascinating frontier town of Blagoveschensk; I was writing about Northeast Asian regional dynamics. Immensely helpful to me was the creative and talented U.S. Consul General in Vladivostok Michael Keays and his dedicated, mostly Russian, staff, who provided me invaluable contacts and advice for my trip. This enabled me to visit several Russian universities and institutes along my route to speak with local academicians and think-tankers who organized several lively sessions with Russian students, most of whom had never met an American in these remote regions. The consul’s well-connected team introduced me to Russian veterans and businessmen, international diplomats also serving in the RFE, and facilitated my travel with links to reliable drivers and train travel.

Throughout I was struck by the international diversity of the region, with numerous Chinese, South Korean, Japanese and Indians among many others working, studying and traveling, especially in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. It’s an arena in which we need to remain actively in the mix — especially if relations eventually improve.

I mention this because my experience was not the exception. All consulates provide variations of these services depending on political conditions and local safety. The Vladivostok Consulate, founded originally in 1874, and reopened in 1992 after the fall of the USSR, provides a wide range of services for Americans working, studying, and traveling through the region. It also provides vital continuity for U.S. business and markets (Exxon Mobil remains nearby in Russian Sakhalin). Once COVID-19 fades, and if somehow relations eventually improve between Washington and Moscow, enhanced RFE commerce with Alaska and the U.S. West coast could be positive, stabilizing drivers. The consulate’s operating cost is paltry for the access and services provided: about $3.2 million dollars.

While arguing the necessity for keeping consulates open within important regions, in the case of Russia, the new Biden foreign policy team should early-on re-address this Trump administration decision, as it develops its initial policy positions regarding a difficult, challenging Kremlin.

Is President Donald Trump a Flight Risk? Yes, this sounds like a B-grade spy novel. But consider the evidence.

He said it.

Earlier this month, at a campaign rally in Macon, Georgia, President Donald Trump mused aloud to the crowd about what he might do if he loses the election on November 3. “Maybe I’ll have to leave the country, I don’t know,” Trump said.

Was the statement merely a sour-grapes throwaway line by a cantankerous candidate facing potential defeat? Or was it a signal that Trump might actually abandon—some would say flee—our shores and seek refuge elsewhere if he is routed by a Joe Biden victory?

During my long military intelligence career I spent countless hours with my peers working on diverse “What if … ?” contingency scenarios in complex locales such as the Balkans and Afghanistan. In these intensely personal environments, where clan or tribal loyalty is paramount, local and regional leaders, often with links to organized criminal activities and enabling transnational networks, could be dangerously unpredictable. Judging from the array of personality traits gleaned from these and numerous other experiences, and correlating them to his current circumstances, to me Trump appears to be a classic flight risk.

Setting aside for the moment his conduct as president, Trump faces a financial and legal reckoning of immense proportions as soon as he leaves office. If he loses, he will no longer have protection from an avalanche of charges and lawsuits against him, his family and the Trump Organization. His years of alleged tax evasion will be officially scrutinized—and far more publicly than before he held office. He will no longer be able to claim (falsely) that his taxes are still “under audit” and unavailable. Trump properties and investments could be frozen, seized or plummet in value. The true nature of his extraordinary personal financial debt—recently reported as $421 million—will be exposed, and his likely foreign creditors revealed. Surely adding to his worries was the announcement on October 15 by the Internal Revenue Service that it is indicting Robert Brockman, a wealthy Houston software magnate, in its largest tax-fraud case ever. The action against Brockman shows that the IRS is not afraid to go after big fish who attempt to circumvent their tax obligations.

Personality and longstanding habits are key factors in assessing a subject’s likely future behavior and choices. Even the most casual observer knows that Donald Trump is heavily invested in his self-image as a successful businessman and wheeler-dealer. He takes pride in flouting norms, finding loopholes and playing fast and loose with laws and the truth. If his private financial house of cards is put on harsh public display in high-stakes government and state-level litigation, the aura of celebrity and success that Trump has cultivated for decades is not likely to survive intact. There is nothing in this president’s demeanor, past or present, to suggest that he has the fortitude or integrity to face auditors, prosecutors, or anyone else who challenges him, particularly if the outcome is likely to involve public humiliation and loss of assets, prestige and power. The option of salvaging what he can by relocating to a jurisdiction beyond the reach of U.S. laws would not be a stretch for someone who has long been openly disdainful of our tax and legal systems.

While it is rare among leaders of developed democracies, during the past 50 years we’ve seen a number of high-profile flights by national leaders facing major legal, political or societal problems at home, These include Bolivian president Evo Morales, who fled to Mexico just last year; Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych, who fled to Russia in 2014; and Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines in 1986. All three fled in the wake of contentious elections, either after being ousted by voters or toppled by sustained protests. At the moment nothing suggests that Trump faces the unlikely prospect of being chased out of the country. But it’s no stretch to point out the parallel, either: They were all unorthodox strongman leaders who abused their offices, and simply didn’t see a way to stay comfortably in their countries once they’d lost power.

In the U.S., Trump might be familiar with some of the high-rolling financial fraudsters who decamped from the U.S. as the law was closing in. Among the most notorious was Robert Vesco, who successfully evaded justice by fleeing in a corporate jet in 1973 and remained out of reach until his death decades later. Less fortunate were Richard Allen Stanford, 2009, and Martin Frankel, 1999. Both tried to escape the U.S. by leasing private jets. Stanford was captured before he could finalize arrangements; Frankel made it as far as Germany but was later extradited to the U.S. for a long jail term.

If Trump were to lose the election and opt to slip away, where, when, and how might such a scenario play out? The “where” is straightforward: His most logical move would be to negotiate asylum somewhere from which extradition would be difficult. Doing so would allow him to temporarily escape U.S. jurisdiction and law, although he would also become in essence a hostage, a gilded trophy of sorts. After first fleeing to Costa Rica in 1973, Vesco made his home in Antigua, Nicaragua and Cuba, whose governments were not inclined to cooperate with U.S. authorities. And Edward Snowden, the disgruntled Booz Allen contractor turned whistleblower, has been living in Russia, under the protection (and eye) of the Putin regime, after fleeing the U.S. in 2013 with a treasure trove of classified information.

When and how Trump might exit the country are slightly more complex questions. If Trump is decisively trounced next week, one subset of possibilities emerges; if his defeat is a narrow one, another subset arises.

If Trump loses badly, it is conceivable he could plan a stealth departure sometime during the 11-week period before Inauguration Day, while he still has the protection of legal immunity as a sitting president. Leaving U.S. airspace before he resumes the status of private citizen at noon on January 20 would allow him to escape—or at least delay—dealing face-to-face with many creditors and lawsuits. Classic indicators of preparation for such a move would include fast sales of domestic properties and investments, and a quiet amassing of wealth offshore, out of reach of U.S. authorities. Trump’s family members and trusted corporate staff would likely be heavily involved in orchestrating the relocation.

A chilling alternative, however fanciful, could arise if Trump flees abroad after losing a close, viciously contested election. Hunkered down in a foreign country willing to provide sanctuary, he could conceivably style himself a “president in exile” and incite his die-hard American followers to resist the election results. A degree of domestic upheaval and dangerous division would linger for an extended period until the new administration is able to foster calm and unity.

How might this happen? What methods might a sitting U.S. president use to leave the country on a one-way journey? The choice could be as brazen as not reboarding Air Force One while out of the country at a conference or summit. Cases abound of athletes and artists escaping repressive regimes by refusing to reboard official aircraft and instead negotiating asylum. While on U.S. shores, Trump could find a creative way to slip his Secret Service detail and fly away in a friend’s private jet or foreign aircraft. Sailing away into international waters would also be a plausible option. In 2019, fugitive U.S. computer-security software magnate John McAfee used his yacht to elude the IRS and Securities and Exchange Commission for months until he was arrested in Spain on October 6, 2020. Steve Bannon made news last August when the Coast Guard arrested him while on a foreign yacht off Connecticut.

If all this sounds like a B-grade spy novel, it should. The flight of a U.S. president would be unprecedented, unsettling and profoundly disappointing. As a minimum, a presidential defection would temporarily absorb the resources and attention of a wide range of U.S. defense, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In more than two centuries of peaceful transfers of presidential power, nothing remotely conceivable like it has ever happened.

I fervently hope we won’t face such a disturbing turn of events. But if there is anything to learn with this president, it is to expect the unexpected. As his unabashed admiration of authoritarian world leaders has shown us these past four chaotic years, Donald Trump values autocrats over democratic government, and places his self-interest well above the sacred trust he was elected to protect and uphold four years ago.

Two men whose fates differed under Trump’s twisted take on justice

Rachel Vindman’s CNN interview on Monday was a tour de force of grace, courage and patriotism. After her husband, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, testified during the House impeachment hearings in October 2019, the Vindmans became the target of vile threats and thuggish retaliation that no American family should have to endure. The most vocal detractor was President Donald Trump, who took aim at Vindman for daring to speak up. In the year since the impeachment hearings, the Vindman family has been harassed and threatened online and by mail by Trump supporters.

“What happened to us could happen to anyone,” Rachel Vindman calmly warns listeners in a new political ad by The Lincoln Project, an anti-Trump Republican campaign organization. This steadfast former Army wife, who represents the best in American values, never imagined she would be speaking in such an antagonistic public arena.
The Vindmans’ year-long ordeal stands in stark contrast to the freedom enjoyed by political operative Roger Stone, a convicted felon coddled by President Trump and his cronies. Emboldened by the commuting of his prison sentence by Trump in July, Stone careens from one dubious media outlet to another, spouting conspiracy theory nonsense and opining that Trump should declare martial law if he loses on November 3.
Polar opposites in every way, the Vindmans and Stone represent the best and worst of America at a deeply painful moment in our nation’s history. President Trump’s unjustified pardon of a convicted liar and his vindictive treatment of a career military family should offend anyone who values integrity, backbone and the courage it takes to speak truth to power — especially when that power is exercised by a vengeful and petty President who utterly lacks all three qualities.
Alexander Vindman worked for me earlier in his career and is hands-down one of the finest and principled officers I’ve had the privilege of knowing. He’s also the quintessential American self-made success story. His widowed father emigrated with his three young sons to Brighton Beach in Brooklyn from then Soviet Ukraine in 1979. Vindman learned English, excelled in school, put himself through college (State University of New York at Binghamton and Cornell, where he chose the military as a career and joined the ROTC). Years later the Army sent him to Harvard for graduate school. In Iraq in 2004, he was wounded by a roadside bomb and received the Purple Heart. In 2008, he became a Foreign Area Officer, serving with me in challenging Moscow as an Army attaché and later was elevated to high-level roles with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.
No one should have to pay the heavy price that Lieutenant Colonel Vindman and his family have for fulfilling his oath to “uphold and defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic.”
close dialog

The Nuances of Navigating a Politically Charged Northeast Asia

Seventy-five years ago, on Sept. 2, 1945, dignitaries from nine Allied Powers boarded the USS Missouri to bear witness to history. Three days earlier, the magnificent warship had entered Tokyo Bay. It was flying the same flag flown over the White House on December 7, 1941, the day of the surprise Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor that catapulted the United States into World War II. Now, almost four years after the attack, a small Japanese delegation joined the gathering on the deck of the USS Missouri and, at the invitation of Gen. Douglas McArthur, two members signed a brief document proclaiming “unconditional surrender … of all Japanese armed forces.” In twenty-three minutes, with a few pen strokes and polite ceremony, a global war that had killed an estimated sixty million people in six years entered the history books. The formal surrender is still a powerful reminder of how quickly events and outcomes can change.

Among the Allies present for the surrender ceremony was the Soviet Union, represented by Lt. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko. During the final months of the war, the forty-year-old Ukrainian-born officer represented the USSR on MacArthur’s staff. Although relatively young, Derevyanko was a key figure in the final wind-up of the war. When Joseph Stalin ominously signaled that the USSR wanted to occupy the Japanese home island of Hokkaido at war’s end, Derevyanko reported back that MacArthur and President Harry Truman were adamantly opposed to the idea. Truman afterward drove home the point himself in a direct communication to Stalin; the Soviets canceled the invasion operation. When Stalin tried again, by proposing the establishment of foreign occupation zones in Japan (similar to the ones in Germany), Derevyanko was the trusted messenger. McArthur curtly informed the Soviet general that he would not accept, nor tolerate, a divided Japan.

Derevyanko took on another assignment for his boss—one that proved to be riskier and more dangerous than any he had undertaken earlier. At Stalin’s behest, he traveled to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to glean the most information possible about the powerful weapons dropped on those cities. Stalin wanted to find out all he could about the technology credited with forcing the Japanese surrender: atomic bombs. Stalin’s ambition—and Derevyanko’s research—helped to ignite and drive the Cold War.

Most of us know what happened next. The USSR tested its first atomic bomb in 1949. Mainland China fell to Mao’s Communists and Chinese nationalists were pushed back to Taiwan. In the meantime, the United States and United Nations managed—only at great cost—to hold back Communist aggression in Korea, an expansion supported by both Russia and China. For well over a decade, the world witnessed what appeared to be a meeting of the minds between the globe’s two largest Communist nations.

But the common front that the two major powers presented to the world in the 1950s was not to last. Centuries of shared frontiers and mutual suspicion trumped short-term cooperation. In 1960, Russia and China had a serious rift over ideology and border issues that culminated in deadly clashes nine years later along the Ussuri River near Khabarovsk.

Three decades later, borders of a different kind came into play. In 1991, the forty-five-year Cold War ended with the mostly peaceful break-up of the Soviet Union. For a brief moment, reborn Russia and the United States might have found it mutually beneficial to encourage players in volatile Asia—including China—to repair fraught relationships and embrace regional stability. Unfortunately, major policy differences between the two powers over the Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia, the Middle East and a host of other issues eclipsed the opportunity, at least in the short-term, to work toward the same ends.

This is unfortunate, because when stripped from western-centric policy tensions, U.S.-Russian interests in Northeast Asia appear more alike than not, especially when it comes to the fractious dynamics between and among nations in the region. I concluded this, having served three years in South Korea, and after multiple travels in Russia’s Far East from 1996 to late 2018 including along the broad Amur River basin separating Russia and China.

Nowhere else in the world is there such a concentration of population-dense nations and resource-deficient economies primed to erupt into bloody conflict following a single incident or inadvertent accident. Historical slights, some enormous in scale, are expediently buried but not forgotten. An arms race is already underway in Northeast Asia, led by China; and a recalcitrant North Korea. The historically deep scars underlying regional tensions could easily be fanned into flames if countries there continue jockeying for control over nebulously claimed islands and territories, most that are perceived to be resource-rich.

Although Russia and the United States have adopted primarily defensive postures in the region, mainly to secure their strategic positions, there is an opportunity to do more. Right now, there’s no formal security mechanism in Northeast Asia to keep collective peace and vital eastern sea lanes open.

The overstretched U.S. Navy and a few regional partners do their best to maintain a calm status quo but they’re not prepared to fully stop distrustful neighbors from going at each other’s throats. The best they can do is earmark tremendous effort and resources to deter regional threats such as Chinese pressure in the South China Sea and unpredictable nuclear-armed North Korea.

Real peace in the region would receive a major boost if Russia could jettison its reflexive desire to see American influence wane in the North Pacific. When first judging economic trade, the whole Pacific, even Russia and China, benefits right now from U.S.-led and financed operations that have repeatedly proven crucial in a region that lacks an inclusive security organization such as proven NATO. If the U.S. retrenches, what would replace it? The successor isn’t likely to be a player who will respect Russia’s sparsely defended borders or keep its hands off of the vast, underpopulated nation’s Far Eastern rich oil and mineral resources. In short, Russia long-term, would be worse off without the regional U.S. presence.

On the eve of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Victory over Japan Day, I believe the time is right to remember that the dangerously distrustful relationship between Russia and the United States has not always been as delicate and strained as it is right now. This also does not have to be zero-sum for either nation regarding relations with China. There’s an urgent need for the United States and Russia to help lead a multi-nation regional dialogue that should include China to sort out the tangled web of history, sensitivities and threat perceptions that still hold sway in national imaginations in the Northeast Pacific.

Russia could even help set the tone. For example, what would it take for Japan and Russia to settle, once and for all, the Kuril Islands dispute dating from the closing days of World War II? Resolving the seventy-five-year-old issue would bring major benefits. Russia would have better access to prosperous Japan. Despite China’s troubling military growth, Japan would have less incentive to continue jettisoning its post-World War II pacifism for even more robustly building up a modern military to defend itself.

Another regional phenomenon develops, a natural one. The strategic importance of the roughly three-thousand-mile long Northern Sea Route (NSR) grows, as its increasingly navigable route melts along Russia’s long coastline with the Arctic. The widening eastern entrance to the NSR, through which increasing Pacific maritime trade traffic headed west, will pass, is the Bering Strait where US and Russian Coast Guards maintain correct, cooperative relations.

Efforts to find common ground in Northeast Asia in no way means reneging, or softening, core positions on other issues or locations. For instance, U.S. support to allies and partners in the region is non-negotiable. However, real cooperation in a strategic region where U.S. and Russian interests align could possibly soften some of the sharp-edged and potentially dangerous situations in other parts of the world.

We would do well to remember the fate of young Derevyanko after his visits to Nagasaki and Hiroshima. His pursuit of a powerful weapon for his boss Stalin ultimately proved a death sentence. In 1954, he died at age fifty of complications due to radiation poisoning. In 2007, in an interesting historical side-note, the Soviet-era general was posthumously awarded the Hero Star from independent Ukraine.

To close, on this historic seventy-fifth anniversary, instead of letting the Pacific region be poisoned—quickly or slowly—by long-term toxic relationships, let’s collectively write a different ending to the story, before it’s too late.

All rights reserved © Peter B Zwack

RECENT POSTS