peter b zwack

GLOBAL SPEAKER

ADVISOR/CONSULTANT

SPEAKER AVAILABILITY & FEES

Leadership
Russia Affairs
Eurasia Affairs
Joint Presentation
Keynote Address

Defense Attaché to Moscow 2012 – 2014

Global Fellow at The Kennan Institute
Woodrow Wilson International Center

University of Pennsylvania – Adjunct Fellow

Senior Russia-Eurasia Research Fellow
National Defense University 2015 – 2019

Stepping back from the brink — and what’s next — in Iran

Iran inadvertently created an opening for Washington and Tehran to step back from the brink of all-out war by not killing U.S. personnel in its retaliatory missile strike Tuesday night into two U.S. and coalition populated Iraqi airbases. Tehran’s belated admission Friday of accidentally shooting down Ukraine Air Flight 752 hours afterward near Tehran’s Imam Khomeini Airport may also have created a slender opportunity to further deescalate this still-simmering crisis, which began five days earlier when a U.S. drone strike killed the powerful Iranian chief of the IRGC Quds force, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad.

I have no doubt that if the Iranian missile strike had killed Americans, a tremendous response from U.S. military assets would have struck Iranian naval, air and missile units deployed in range of the Gulf region and possibly even its nuclear infrastructure. Aghast, the world would have been horrified but would have stepped back, with more than a few nations quietly supportive of the action.

Both sides appear to have stepped back to avoid a nasty and regionally dangerous shooting war — but for how long?

With Soleimani gone, Iranian “honor” at least temporarily assuaged by the missile attack and while Iranian leaders and people grapple with the shocking reality of the airliner’s destruction, is there any way to reap a long-term benefit from this step back?

Can mutual equities be addressed while excising primal Iranian fears of U.S.-led regime change efforts? Or are tensions so high, worldviews so different, issues so complex, and hostility so deep that real reconciliation — that would have to involve Iran’s Sunni neighbors and Israel — impossible?

The roiling “gray zone” of undeclared asymmetric war involving cyber, proxies and terror always beckons.

Geostrategic spoiler nations such as Russia and China may prefer the U.S. and Iran to remain at loggerheads, consuming Washington’s attention and resources while inflaming domestic division and eroding Western cohesion. Thursday’s aggressive and dangerous maneuvering of a Russian warship near the USS Farragut in the North Arabian Sea portends so — and does not bode well for any substantive U.S.-Russian effort to cooperatively resolve these core issues.

Washington got it right by taking a measured approach after Iran’s missile retaliation.

Incendiary rhetoric was muted.

Many — including myself, and clearly the Iranians — thought we would strike back. This near certainty is the probable reason that Iranian air-defense, certainly on high-alert, accidentally shot down the hapless Ukrainian airliner. This horror has a dreadful symmetry with the Iranian airliner that the Aegis missile cruiser USS Vincennes accidentally shot down during the 1988 Gulf crisis.

When tensions are fraught, communications near nil and threat perceptions high, this is when the “laws of unintended consequences” are most dangerous, and unfortunately — and almost invariably — innocent lives are lost.

What would I want to see happen next?

My Pollyanna-ish side desires — somehow — a bipartisan Washington effort backed by allies, regional partners and even Russia and China to enter into comprehensive negotiations with Tehran to address the core drivers of this major societal and perception-driven conflict.

If this administration truly wants to leave an enduring legacy, it would strive to broker some type of long-lasting agreement to bring Iran back into the mainstream community of nations.

Tehran as a prerequisite would have to curtail its attempts to destabilize its neighbors and to militantly expand Shiite influence through the region. Such a negotiation would be even broader in scope than the hard-negotiated multinational JCPOA (Iran nuclear agreement) from which the U.S. unilaterally withdrew in 2018.

Any diplomatic breakthrough with Tehran — as unlikely as it may be — would dwarf in significance the stumbling negotiations with manipulative and petulant Pyongyang.

Iran and its proud Persian legacy is too large, too regionally influential, too energy rich and has too large a diaspora both ethnically and religiously, to indefinitely isolate and sanction without the support of most of the global community. Ideally, a forward-thinking Russia with its recently gained regional political capital would even co-partner this project with the U.S. and other key nations — as occurred in the JCPOA — and not undermine it. A chaotic and unresolved Middle East will likely bring major internal problems for Moscow in future generations.

A possible template for any rapprochement could be the Camp David breakthrough in 1978 between seemingly irreconcilable Egypt and Israel that has netted a viable though edgy peace between Cairo and Jerusalem for the past 42 years.

To do even an iota of any of this would mandate some type of credible “hot-line” mechanism between Tehran, Washington and other key players to deconflict the inevitable incidents and attacks from proxies, splinter groups and lone wolves that would work at all costs to destabilize any improved, less confrontational relationship.

This administration’s international track record on agreements and treaties could hobble any such effort, as partners might wonder if Washington would be a reliable signatory to any multinational agreement.

Also, our own divided body politic — absorbed by impeachment and the looming election cycle — could be our own worst obstacle. Our partisan divide has, sadly, become a strategic issue.

What I believe actually will happen:

My 38 years of military intelligence, analysis and deployments into difficult places takes my expectations to a darker sphere.

The entire Middle East is on fire in varying degrees. Twenty years of U.S. “boots-on-the-ground” blood and treasure in the Middle East has netted little in regional stability beyond propping our increasingly assertive Israeli ally and ensuring the viability of states and sea lanes essential to critical flow of oil and trade.

The menace of ISIS — which ironically Washington, Moscow, Damascus, Baghdad, Tehran, Jerusalem and others have all combatted and severely bloodied — failed to pull the region together. Its embers risk burning hot again as regional infighting distracts from its existential threat.

Iran will be perpetually distrusted and confronted until it convincingly renounces — by action and verification — its redeclared nuclear program.

Meanwhile, despite Soleimani’s death, his network of destabilizing, mostly Shiite proxies and militias — with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) most notable — continue fighting and subverting regionally, from Lebanon to Yemen.

And finally, the greater Arab-Israel-Iran conflict, with Palestine as its apex issue, remains hot and intractable. Tehran renouncing its stated position that Israel has no right to exist would be a critical first step toward any regional cooling off, however unlikely that may be. In turn, Israel must cease its expansion on the West Bank.

Thus, it’s likely that familiar tensions, actions and reactions will continue to plague the region, though the recent U.S. and Iranian temperance has created some breathing space.

Yet … there is a glimmer.

If anything remotely positive could come from the death of the 163 innocents in the air over Tehran, it would be a realization that all has gone too far and must stop.

Iran broke from its indefensible denials and admitted — and conditionally apologized for — the accident, while blaming the U.S. and the Soleimani strike for initiating the dangerous chain of events.

Maybe somehow, the shock, embarrassment and remorse of this accident could jar calcified regime thinking in Tehran.

It likely will sensitize Iran’s more moderate mainstream, which — after a violent regime crackdown in late 2019 — rallied around Iran’s flag following Soleimani’s death. Literally as I write, Iran’s momentary national unity may be eroding as crowds in several Iranian cities demonstrate in apparent anger with the regime’s clumsy handling of the commercial airplane shootdown — in which 82 Iranian citizens perished. The unrest may spread, making the overall situation even more unstable and unpredictable.

Whatever happens, any sense of genuine Iranian contrition could increase Tehran’s credibility both domestically and on the global stage. That — coupled with a firm but non-bellicose American posture — could go far in calming tensions and opening possibilities during this dangerous period.

While I doubt any of this will transpire, I very much want to be contradicted and surprised.

Stepping back from the brink — and what’s next — in Iran

Iran inadvertently created an opening for Washington and Tehran to step back from the brink of all-out war by not killing U.S. personnel in its retaliatory missile strike Tuesday night into two U.S. and coalition populated Iraqi airbases. Tehran’s belated admission Friday of accidentally shooting down Ukraine Air Flight (more…)

Averting war in 2020

In the first week of the new decade, we face another potential war in the Middle East. With last Friday’s early morning strike killing General Qassem Soleimani, the ruthlessly charismatic chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, we have entered uncharted waters.

While on first blush I supported the strike, since then I have felt considerable unease, wondering if we are ready to bear the brunt of inevitable “laws of unintended consequences.” It is as if we’ve taken a big stick and overwhelmingly batted down a hornet’s nest. The question now is how and where the many hornets will sting. That Iran and its proxies will retaliate is the only predictable aspect of this emergent challenge. The questions are how, where and when?

I just pulled down Lt. Col. (ret) Ralph Peters’s fittingly-titled novel, “The War in 2020” from my bookcase. I gave it a quick scan to refresh my memory. Written in 1990 before the fall of the USSR, Peters described a dystopian world 30 years in the future that found an ill-prepared U.S. military fighting an ugly war supporting Moscow in still-Soviet Central Asia and the Caspian region versus an array of foes that included an Iranian-led Islamic coalition and Japan. The conflict also raged in Africa and South America. While a futuristic tale that thankfully did not play out, for me its paramount lesson was the ever-changing nature of war. In the pre-cyber world, Peters wrote presciently of critical computer-driven capabilities and hideous new asymmetric weapons systems. Also used were chemical weapons and biological vectors. While impossible to precisely predict the future, the story expanded minds and challenged possibilities. We need to be brainstorming this way today.

As we marshal our thinking and resources to face likely Iranian retaliation there is much to consider.

First, we must get our own internal political house in order. It is crucial that we somehow find a unified bipartisan approach to this emergent crisis, one that transcends American political infighting and electoral posturing. A likely unintended consequence of this strike, one that shadowed earlier discussions about preemptively hitting Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure, is that — at least temporally — the proud Iranians are again unified in support of their nation and regime. In turn, we are divided internally and are not in lock-step with our allies. Notably, NATO just suspended its training mission in riven Iraq.

A Washington-Tehran diplomatic track should engage in a search for a viable “off-ramp” away from this menacing brink of war.

Other nations ­— especially North Korea, China and Russia — must be reminded that it would be folly if they engaged in opportunistic regional adventurism during this fraught period where nerves are sensitive and tempers hot.

There is a significant Russian dimension to all this.  While not friends, Moscow and Tehran share considerable interests in the Middle East, especially with their combined proxies in Syria and shared hostility to the U.S. and its allies. Moscow should be urged to press Tehran to exercise restraint in the Persian Gulf region and rein in its proxy partners in Syria and Lebanon. If they don’t, the Israelis will likely intervene even more aggressively against Iranian proxies in Syria, putting Russian entities into a potentially dangerous crossfire. The Middle East in freefall is also dangerous for Russia.

The Iranians are proven masters at calibrating and masking their malign regional and global actions to a threshold just below a massive U.S. or Israeli retaliation. It is a dangerous game — especially now — because if they miscalculate, they invite terrible retribution. For this reason, it is likely that their responses will be measured, often lethal but mostly cloaked in deniability and non-attribution. Their recent attacks on Persian Gulf shipping and drone strikes on oil infrastructure likely only hint at their real capabilities.

By this calculus, much is vulnerable within the U.S. and allied infrastructure beyond more hardened military and governmental targets. The Iranian and non-state actor cyber threat is real and proven. False-flag actions, meaning nations and entities pretending to be another state are also possible. Nothing — including business interests, stock markets, civilian infrastructure including nuclear and power facilities — would be out of bounds. Plans for chemical or biological incidents should be dusted off and updated.

Remembering the 1970s’ spate of terrorist attacks and hijackings — despite much improved security — we must realize that civilians worldwide, including tourists in public places and traveling onaircraft, buses and ships, remain vulnerable to both state and local terror. While Iranian-backed attacks against these “targets” could prove suicidal for Tehran, they should be considered as a distinct possibility if relations further deteriorate.

Finally, our eyes must not be taken off ISIS and Al Qaeda. Enemies of both Washington and Tehran (and Moscow, Baghdad, Damascus and Tel Aviv) they would gain respite and strength from any distracting U.S.-Iranian crisis and further sectarian  erosion of the increasingly fragile Iraqi state.

To close, we are in a dangerous, nuanced period that could rapidly escalate — or simmer deceptively. We should have confidence in our extraordinary military and its ability to prevail in any direct conflict. The full capability and knowledge of our interagency and intelligence community, if properly focused on this and other threats, is also formidable and should be fully leveraged by a bipartisan Capitol Hill to support decision-making. National-level policy messaging must be better coordinated, while discouraging ill-disciplined public bombast that alienates friends and energizes foes.

We must work to rebuild trust with our allies and search within the international community for a credible crisis off-ramp with Tehran.

Along with our core warfighting skills, we must, however — as a clarion call for action — be ready for a nasty, no-holds-barred action, especially in the murky and asymmetric spectrum of conflict.

Averting war in 2020

In the first week of the new decade, we face another potential war in the Middle East. With last Friday’s early morning strike killing General Qassem Soleimani, the ruthlessly charismatic chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, we have entered uncharted waters.

While on first blush I supported the strike since then I have felt considerable unease, wondering if we are ready to bear the brunt of inevitable “laws of unintended consequences.” (more…)

Why NATO is worth preserving for US, Europe — and even Russia

Why NATO is worth preserving for US, Europe — and even Russia 
© Getty Images

President Donald Trump is in London today for a short summit tomorrow with fellow leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Auspiciously it lands on the 70th anniversary year of NATO’s founding in the tense early days of the Cold War where it — along with the Marshall Plan — signaled a deep and long-term American commitment to Europe’s democracy-based freedom and stability. This investment allowed fellow democracies and peaceful nations to safely evolve, creating a global environment where U.S. interests and businesses could flourish.

The summit comes at a pivotal time — accentuated by French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent declaration that the alliance was “brain-dead” — where the United State’s traditionally guiding role and philosophy appears more confusing than affirming for our allies in NATO and worldwide. The Trump administration’s transactional messaging and unilateral actions, often broadcast publicly rather than negotiated privately, are shredding allied confidence in U.S. reliability and creating malign openings for potential adversaries. They weaken an extraordinary assemblage of allies and partners that — despite differences — have mostly supported the United States since WWII through thick and thin. This is strategic.

As a long-time NATO interlocutor, I want to relate the following experience that buttressed to me that the U.S. military — despite the current political noise — still maintains strong, credible relations with their allied counterparts. A month ago, I revisited NATO’s mostly-forgotten Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission after participating in a progressive security conference in Belgrade, Serbia. I served in Kosovo during 2003-2004 as the senior KFOR intelligence staff officer during a difficult period that culminated in violent riots that left 35 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries destroyed by Albanian mobs. For balance, we must recall that KFOR was established in 1999 after the U.S.-led NATO intervention to stop the ethnic cleansing of mostly Kosovar Albanians at the hands of dominating Serbia.

During my week in Pristina I was heartened to see troops from multiple NATO and Partner nations working in close coordination to ensure a safe and secure environment for all the citizens — Albanian, Serbian, Roma — living in Kosovo. Unknown to many, there are still over 600 American soldiers, mostly New Jersey National Guardsmen, currently serving there, an integral part of NATO’s 3,500 soldier multinational force of 28 nations. Commanded by an Italian Major General, KFOR’s Deputy is a Swiss, and Chief of Staff an American, both Brigadier Generals.

The alliance matters to this still volatile Balkan region. So does the American presence within and anywhere the alliance serves. I can’t overstate how moved I was to see American soldiers literally assaulted in South Mitrovica with hugs and tears by wizened Albanian gentlemen after seeing our small group with their U.S. flags on their shoulders.

Over my 38-year military and government career, I served with allies in diverse locations worldwide such as West Germany, South Korea, Kosovo, Afghanistan and within complex Moscow. An unforgettable personal moment while working NATO policy issues on our Joint Staff was in March 1999 when I stood proudly with our new Polish allies in Warsaw’s Pilsudski Square the exact second they entered the alliance. NATO came to our aid after 9/11 and served with us in Afghanistan, Iraq and numerous other locations. A little-known fact is that there has never been conflict between NATO members over its long 70-year history, except for the clash over Cyprus in 1974 between Greece and Turkey. Based on these hands-on global experiences I am an unabashed “Atlanticist” … and internationalist.

I fervently believe that after the natural creativity and adaptability of our population and our nation’s natural resources, that our greatest strength, precious really, is the network of mostly like-minded allies and partners worldwide that we’ve worked with in unison to ensure a better and more stable planet.

We learned the bitter lessons of isolationism after WWI, where after Pearl Harbor we entered WWII unprepared for an existential no-quarter fight against a vicious array of dictatorial states. As the post-WWII and Cold War eras increasingly wobble, we dare not make that mistake again.

For our Russian counterparts, I will simply say that NATO does not want conflict but will fight hard if pressed. Ideally the stability it brings Europe benefits Moscow too … NATO’s existence is not just about Russia. Working to weaken, corrode it and the European Union from within and without, only strengthens resolve. There will always be coalitions of the willing.

I also caution that a Europe bereft of credible security structures as the blood-soaked 20th Century has proven, would likely break into right-leaning mini-pakts, ententes and treaties that over time could boomerang badly for a stretched Russia. Better to identify positive convergences of interest and work collectively on those, while also focusing on root causes where we remain at dangerous loggerheads. The next generation, all of us, will face difficult mutual challenges.

As we move to this week’s London NATO Summit, the overall alliance — while physically strong — seems wounded, perplexed and unsure of its direction. NATO’s and Europe’s mission priority — whether focused east toward traditional Russia threat concerns, south toward the roiling Mediterranean, or on terror — is debated. Looking worldwide, at a critical time in Asia our ties with traditional allies such as Japan and South Korea are also eroding and being exploited.

I worry that the imperfectly unique quality of altruistic hardness our country has exuded for most of the past century — our magnificent “American Brand” — is fading, replaced by a perception by some that we are becoming a more domineering and transactional hegemon. Are some traditional allies and partners still knitted to us because they feel they have to, rather than because they want to? A core question I think. We must at all costs cherish our allies and reverse this debilitating perception. 

All rights reserved © Peter B Zwack

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